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Education Patterns in the Context of an Emergency 
Abstract 
Education in Afghanistan is in crisis. 
This discussion examines the context 
that structures the Afghan crisis. 
Amongst the vast plentitude of chal- 
lenges confronting Afghanistan today, 
thosein educationare the mostparadoxi- 
cal. On the one hand, one is told that 
education forms the foundation upon 
which all reconstruction rests. On the 
other hand, education remains the most 
severely underfunded sector in humani- 
tarian assistance toAfghanistan.l 
L'e'ducation en Afghanistunest en crise. 
Le pre'sent expose' examine les contextes 
structurant cette crise afghane. Dam la 
vaste multitude de de'fis auxquels 
I'Afghanistan contemporain faitface, les 
de'fis kducationnels sont les plus para- 
doxaux. D'un cbte' on entend le message 
selon lequel l'e'ducation f o m  le fonde- 
ment sur lequel toute reconstruction na- 
tionale repose. D'un autre cbtt, 
l'e'ducation demeure le plus shhement 
sous-finance'de tous les secteurs d'action 
humanitaire en Afghanistan. 
Today 
Since the rise of the Taliban Islamic 
Movement (now styled the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan) in 1994: the 
crisis in education has been exacer- 
bated by official pronouncements ban- 
ning girls from attending school and 
female teachers from teaching. Donors 
have predictably reacted with their own 
principle-centred ~tatements.~ Educa- 
tion continues to deteriorate as the im- 
passe hardens. 
The seriousness of this deterioration 
becomes starker when seen against the 
already abysmal state of education in 
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Afghanistan before the conflict began 
after the 1978 coup d'etat. Pre-war 
trends persist and provide useful pat- 
terns of comparison. Economic, re- 
gional and gender imbalance in literacy 
rates were abundantly noticeable. The 
1975 literacy rate was estimated at 11.4 
percent (18.7Y~males; 2.8% females). In 
urban settings, 25.9 percent (35.5% 
males; 14.8%females) of the population 
six years old and over were literate, but 
in rural areas only 8.8 percent (15.7% 
males; 0.6% females, in some provinces 
0.1%).4 Regionally, 32 percent of the stu- 
dents lived in and around the capital 
city of Kabul in 1978, compared with 
only 3.3 percent living in the central 
 mountain^.^ 
The absence of reliable data and the 
unstable political situation render sta- 
tistics meaningless in 1998. Neverthe- 
less, it does not take much imagination 
to calculate the enormity of the emer- 
gency in light of the war-destroyed in- 
frastructure, the loss of qualified staff, 
the inattention of national authorities, 
and donor reluctance. Fifteen NGOs, 
both Afghan and international, operate 
in the field. They function in 25 of Af- 
ghanistan's 32 provinces, providing 
services to perhaps some 250,000 indi- 
viduals, mostly on primary levels. This 
meets only a fraction of the needs. 
Moreover, projects are scattered, often 
intermittent because of funding short- 
ages, and, with notable exceptions, the 
quality is frequently inconsistent and 
woefully below minimum standards. 
Among refugee populations in Paki- 
stan there are an estimated 230,000 chil- 
dren of primary age in the officially 
recognized refugee camps and settle- 
ments composed largely of families from 
rural areas. Of these children, some 
90,000 receive educational services6 
For urban populations living outside the 
official camps, education is a scandal. 
After the Taliban swept into Kabul in 
September 1996, scores of families left, 
only to find that assistance to refugees 
in Pakistan had been cut to a bare mini- 
mum. Schools outside the officially 
administered camps had all but disap- 
peared. Donors had decreed that 
schools retarded repatriation and at- 
tracted new refugees. 
Indeed, it was the rapid decline of 
education in Kabul that induced many 
families to leave. There were no schools 
for girls, services at boys' schools were 
deplorable because 70 percent of their 
teachers had been women who were no 
longer permitted to work, and the con- 
servative orientation of the new au- 
thorities threatened to confine the 
curriculum solely to religion. Even 
Taliban officials keep their families in 
Pakistan so that their children could 
attend schools with wider horizons. En- 
trance to Pakistani-run schools, how- 
ever, is difficult and expensive. So while 
there is a tremendous demand, access to 
qualified facilities is slight. Opportun- 
ists thrive under such conditions and 
their sign boards beckon anxious par- 
ents in almost every Peshawar alley- 
way. In return for the fees, however, the 
majority offer precious little in the way 
of qualified teachers, uniform text- 
books, curriculum, or supplies. 
Both inside and outside Afghani- 
stan, education had become such a 
burning issue by mid-1997 that aid pro- 
viders met in a series of meetings 
seeking new, common strategies for 
improving access, quality, and capaci- 
ties.' Before devising strategies, how- 
ever, it is well to be aware of the existing 
education fabric. What patterns existed 
before the war? What purposes did edu- 
cation serve? Who benefited, in what 
ways? These questions form the focus of 
this discussion. 
Way Back 
Education has alwaysbeen a treasured 
ideal in this region where renowned 
centres of learning flourished during 
various historical periods. In addition, 
since seeking knowledge is sanctified 
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by the Islamic injunction that all good 
Muslims, including women, should 
seek education so as to better provide 
social justice for the community, all 
knowledgeable individuals, not only 
scholars, are accorded measurable re- 
spect. Thus one finds that bonds be- 
tween teachers and pupils are strong, 
second only to those governing the 
rights and obligations of families. 
In practice, however, the ideal was 
confined largely to elites flourishing at 
the Islamic courts of the Samanids in 
Balkh in the 9th century, the 
Ghaznavids in Ghavli during the 10th 
and 11th centuries, the Timurids in 
Herat in the 15th, and in Kandahar in 
the 18th century. 
By the 19th century, this high tradi- 
tion of scholarship provided the form 
for traditionallearning, althoughmuch 
of the creativity of earlier times hadbeen 
lost. It was focused on the transmission 
of Islamic doctrine through the institu- 
tional structure and organization of 
madrassas centered around reputed 
scholar/tutors with their devoted disci- 
ples. These centres of leaming were pri- 
vate concerns attached tomosques and 
supported by communities as well as 
rich patrons. There was no uniformity 
in curriculum. Teaching methods relied 
heavily on recitation and memory. 
The lower levels of educational es- 
tablishments were also found in com- 
munity-supported mosques in villages, 
district towns and city neighbour- 
hoods. Here, instruction, again withno 
uniform curriculum, dwelt almost ex- 
clusively on imparting knowledge of the 
ritual, beliefs, practices and moral 
teachings of Islam taught by the rote 
reading of the Koran and other popular 
literary devices utilizing classical Per- 
sian poetry and prose with a goodly 
admixture of customary tribal beliefs. 
Two popular texts, Panj Ganj, and, 
Kulliyat-i Chahar Kitab, expound on the 
duties of good Muslims, correct be- 
haviour, and other types of religious 
kno~ledge.~ Unfortunately, numerous 
superstitions and prejudices also ap- 
pear. Attitudes concerning female 
foibles and male superiority are en- 
trenched at a very early age through 
these texts. 
The local mosque schools were too 
often taught by mullahs with minimal 
education; sometimes they were barely 
literate. They relied on recitation, memo- 
rization and endless repetition. Com- 
prehension was of little relevance and a 
favoured teaching aid was a long stick 
used to jar the inattentive unlucky 
enough to err. 
Although respect for learning con- 
tinued as the end of the 19th century 
approached, the bulk of the population 
remained illiterate. Learning to read the 
Koranby rote did not necessarily mean 
learning to write. 
Reforms Begin and End: 
1880s-1929 
Although Amir Sher Ali opened what 
might be called the first modem schools 
as early as 1868, the absence of educated 
subjects irritated the creator of the first 
centralized nation-state in Afghani- 
stan. 
Amir Abdur Rahrnan (1880-1901) 
relates that on coming to the throne in 
1880, he sought 30 clerks who could 
read and write, but could only find 
three. As a result he made education a 
pillar of his reforms. He opened schools 
in major towns and had the foresight to 
order the printing of thousands of 
books. 
Thus education served to strengthen 
the Amir's administration, but his vi- 
sion went far beyond this. His ultimate 
goal was to establish a centralized, inte- 
grated autocratic nation-state and to 
extend his authority over all aspects of 
society so that Afghanistan might ac- 
quire a respected place within the com- 
ity of nations. Educated subjects, 
including women, were imperative, he 
said. But he also insisted women remain 
in seclusion, seeing nothing inconsist- 
ent in the two: 
Owing to the wisdom of our Holy 
Prophet, who commanded that 
women under no circumstances 
should ever leave their houses with- 
out the consent and permission of 
their husbands, women should be 
allowed to do so for one purpose 
only, that of being educated? 
The Amir also devoted much of his 
efforts to reorganizing a state-super- 
vised religious hierarchy which effec- 
tively curtailed their heretofore domi- 
nation of education. The intent was not 
to destroy the religious establishment, 
but to subordinate it to the centre, 
thereby co-opting high officials at major 
religious institutions as spokesmen for 
the legitimacy of the Amir's moderniza- 
tion policies.1° 
The dynamics between the tradi- 
tional and the modem became more 
apparent during the reign of Amir 
Abdur Rahman's son and successor, 
Amir Habibullah (1901-1919), who 
had neither the ruthlessness nor the po- 
litical skills of his father. As a conse- 
quence the religious establishment 
regained some of its lost influence, al- 
though the Amir diligently furthered 
several aspects of modernization so as 
to continue to improve the nation's im- 
age while Russia and England played 
their Great Game. 
The first truly modem secular school 
was ~abibiya, opened in 1903. It was 
modelled after Aligarh College in India. 
In 1904, a school for the children of no- 
tables was established, which became 
the military college known as Harbiya 
headed by a Turkish military officer. 
The primary school system was ex- 
panded in 1915 and textbooks as well as 
instruction were provided free. 
King Amanullah (1919-1929) ex- 
panded his father's education services. 
Eight modern, foreign-language 
schools, five for boys and three for girls, 
were active by the end of his reign; some 
were upgraded to high schools, with 
French, German and English instruc- 
tion at the boys schools. Turkish, 
French, German and Indian female 
teachers taught science and foreignlan- 
guages at Masturat, the first school for 
girls which opened in 1921. By 1929, the 
total enrolment in formal state-spon- 
sored secular schools for girls num- 
bered 700." 
Students, both boys and girls, were 
mostly, although not entirely, upper 
elites. Years later, even after education 
became more widely accessible to the 
middle class, these early schools re- 
mained elitist centres of learning. By 
1978, graduates of state-run schools in 
Kabul dominated top positions in the 
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bureaucracy; most prominent political 
leaders during the war years, on both 
the left and the right, were also gradu- 
ates of this system. 
By 1929, several patterns had been 
set. First, leaders emerged from state 
secular schools, not from private 
madrassas. Second, most, if not all, sub- 
stantive improvements in education 
were provided by outside assistance. 
This trend continued particularly as 
university faculties were later estab- 
lished,12 Third, this period marks the 
beginning of the bifurcation of educa- 
tion into two parallel systems: tradi- 
tional religious and modem secular. 
From this time onward the influence of 
one over the other intensified according 
to political developments, and the di- 
vide was often racked with tensions. 
King Amanullah's zeal for mod- 
ernization struck out against many 
conservative customary practices. In- 
flamed, the traditionalists revolted. As 
the tribalmomentumescalated,theKing 
was confronted with numerous de- 
mands, number one among which was 
the closure of secular schools, particu- 
larly those for girls. A Pushtun tribal 
army advancing from the east unseated 
the king and its Tajik leader ruled Kabul 
for nine months until he too was toppled 
in October 1929. 
Consolidation: 1929-1960s 
King Nadir Khan (1929-1933) came to 
the throne with the support of the tribal 
forces that helped him conquer Kabul, 
and the religious leaders gained more 
influence as a result. Many of 
Amanullah's reforms were abandoned, 
but secular education, including 
schools for girls in separate facilities, 
expanded both geographically as well 
as academically under royal patronage. 
King Nadir found his throne shaky 
and his coffers empty. To remedy this, 
secular education was promoted not 
only to help secure loyalty towards the 
monarchy but also to produce the man- 
power needed to increase productivity. 
While Islam was evoked at every oppor- 
tunity so as to strengthen nationalunity, 
the gradual, cautious promotion of 
secular education was employed in 
order to convince traditionalists that Is- 
lam and modernization were compat- 
ible. 
These policies continued to mould 
education over the next three decades 
and the sector grew as an adjunct to 
development by preparing loyal tech- 
nocrats andbureaucrats for anexpand- 
ing government. 
Statistics in Afghanistan are always 
risky, but they do indicate patterns.13 
The growth of formal government 
schools appear thus: 
1930: 13 institutions and 1,590 stu- 
dents, 
1967: 2,567 institutions and 497,911 
students. l4 
It was during this time of major 
growth that compulsory primary edu- 
cation was constitutionally enshrined, 
first in Article 20 of the 1931 Constitu- 
tion. Article34 of the 1964 Constitution 
stated that education is a right of every 
Afghan and that education shallbepro- 
vided free by the state, that the state is 
obliged to provide suitable facilities, 
and that it is a state duty to guide and 
supervise. This Article also allowed 
Afghan nationals to establish technical 
and literacy schools outside the state 
system, the curricula of which, however, 
were still tobe determined according to 
state laws. 
The government never had the funds 
or the capability to realize this constitu- 
tional ideal. Nevertheless, the concept 
of the right of every citizen to enjoy free 
compulsory education was a matter of 
pride, which is deeply ingrained in the 
minds of educated Afghans today. They 
are loathe to see this right compromised. 
The Explosion: 1960s and 1970s 
By the time the 1964 Constitution was 
promulgated, the government, feeling 
securely backed by a strong military 
base of power, had already launched an 
unprecedented surge in development 
and reforms including support for the 
voIuntary end of purdah and removal of 
the veil. Teaching became an acceptable 
career for women active in public life. 
Primary schools and Kabul University 
became co-educational, while middle 
and high schools remained in separate 
facilities. As the industrial sector grew, 
rural-urban migration increased, giv- 
ing many more children access to 
schooling on all levels. In addition, for- 
eign investors in thenew industrial sec- 
tor sent more and more students, both 
men and women, overseas for higher 
training. By 1974, some 1,500 a year 
were leaving for studies abroad. 
Of course, traditional mosque 
schools continued to function in un- 
counted numbers, with all the short- 
comings described still intact. These 
were still largely supported by their 
communities, but in keeping with its 
consistent desire to retain a tight grip on 
all things educational, the central gov- 
ernment introduced regulatory meas- 
ures toward the end of the 1960s to 
standardize and coordinate the activi- 
ties of those madrassas established 
through local initiatives. 
By 1978, the number of schools had 
risen to 3,825 with over a million stu- 
dents taught by almost 40,000 teach- 
ers.15 Another set of statistics indicates 
that only 12 percent of these schools 
were for girls, but of course many girls 
attended co-educational schools. 0th- 
ers still studied at home where their in- 
struction may well have been superior 
to what they would have received in 
schools. The percentages of school-age 
girls enrolled in primary schools (8.6%), 
middle schools (3%) and Lycee with 
grades 10-12 (1.4%), although discour- 
aging, were nevertheless twice the 
number in grades 1-9 and five times the 
number in grades 10-12 compared to 
the 1%0s.l6 
Amir Abdur Rahman would no 
doubt have been able to find 30 clerks, 
male or female, to help withhis admin- 
istration by 1978. Nevertheless, in terms 
of the requirements for truly functional 
literates, the situation in 1978 was fully 
as inadequate as it had been in 1880. 
Indeed, the Amir's search would have 
been further beset by masses of only 
marginally employable school gradu- 
ates. By 1978, anestimated 70 percent of 
school graduates were unemployed. 
Graduates were either ill-trained, 
overly-trained or, as was often the case, 
capable only of performing routine ad- 
ministrative jobs which were already 
filled. 
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The education sector, therefore, was 
inadequate even before the onset of war 
in 1978. 
What Happened? 
For one hundred years many schools 
representing very large expenditures of 
money and effort had come into being, 
yet Afghanistan's education achieve- 
ments remained the lowest in Asia." 
Where did the problems lie? 
On the upper administrative levels, 
the Ministry of Education had all the 
departments requisite for a good deliv- 
ery system, but there was a sad absence 
of dynamic policy-making leadership. 
This should not have been, for the min- 
isters and high officials were chosen 
from among the most capable, forward- 
looking Afghans available; many held 
advanced degrees in education from 
respected foreign academic institu- 
tions. But it was difficult to maintain 
any consistency. Ministers, beingpoliti- 
cal appointees each with their own 
agendas, were removed with great ra- 
pidity before they could affect any last- 
ing impact. Between 1964 and 1973, five 
different governments came and went. 
Worse, ministers often succumbed to 
a general malaise because they could 
not persuade the King to issue the nec- 
essary authorizations that would en- 
able them to initiate new approaches. 
The King was dilatory in this regard 
because of the influence of overly cau- 
tious family advisors. They feared that 
changes toward amore effective, broad- 
based education system would ulti- 
mately undermine the autocratic 
position of the royal elite. Subsequent 
events proved they were right. 
In themeantime, the system plodded 
along with many difficulties, many of 
which are mirrored in today's inad- 
equacies. Rural-urban, geographic, 
elite-commoner and gender gaps per- 
sisted. Quantity did not mean quality. 
Despite the existence of several teacher- 
training institutions, lectures on good 
techniques did not guarantee good 
teaching. Rote memorization contin- 
ued. Classrooms were teacher-centered, 
not child-centered. Teachers ex- 
pounded, students listened, rarely pos- 
ing questions, and seldom interacting 
in discussions. Remembering, not 
thinking, was important. Lessons were 
monotonous and boring, students pas- 
sive and inattentive. Many dropped out. 
Dependable textbooks were limited. 
Lessons were focused on facts, not 
ideas. Supplementary teaching aids 
and reading materials providing more 
entertaining lessons were all but non- 
existent. And, even when they were 
available, few cared to take advantage 
of them. Students preferred to follow 
prescribed texts tenaciously, objecting 
to the intrusion of other materials. Also, 
it is questionable whether supplemen- 
tary readings would have been very in- 
spiring since all published material was 
subject to state-censorship throughout 
the twentieth century. 
Good teachers seldom wished to 
serve outside the cities; those who did 
serve in the provinces seldomattempted 
to identify with the communities in 
which they were posted. Certainly the 
concept that teachers ran perform lead- 
ership roles was seldom realized. 
Trained teachers most often stood 
apart. The communities preferred it that 
way for they regarded teachers as out- 
siders, as government agents, tobe held 
warily at arms length. Of course there 
were notable exceptions. 
Already noted is the fad that foreign- 
ers of all sorts and languages were con- 
spicuous on the education scene from 
the time secular education was intro- 
duced, both physically as teachers and 
advisors and as funders. This presence 
of foreigners in the sensitive arena of 
moulding the minds of youth disturbed 
the traditionalists and conservatives, 
many of whom found secular education 
repugnant. This exacerbated tensions. 
Failings within thebureaucracy were 
responsible for much of the sterility and 
stagnation that characterized the entire 
systemby 1978. Today exactly the same 
mind-sets affect officials, many of 
whom are hold-overs from pre-war 
days. They stubbornly resist innova- 
tions; change is anathema to them. Hav- 
ing survived the King, Daud, Taraki, 
Najibullah, Rabbani, and now the 
Taliban, they know that continued sur- 
vival depends on keeping the system 
functioning without rocking any boats. 
As in the past, these officials are 
perpetuators, not innovators. This is a 
big stumbling block. 
This is particularly evident in regard 
to curriculum. In the past apathetic atti- 
tudes toward school attendance, the 
high drop out rates and the graduation 
of semi-functional literates to whom 
critical and analytical thinking was al- 
ien, were due largely to the rigidity of old 
curricula. 
In the rural areas, the question was: 
Why waste time going to school when 
what I learned there is not relevant tomy 
daily life? Even the highly touted re- 
vised textbooks from the 1960s and 
1970s were oriented toward upper and 
middle class urban populations. 
In addition, there was little under- 
standing that education should en- 
hance interacting economic and social 
expectations. In urban settings, stu- 
dents were led toward social behaviour 
that was not gradually adjusted to tradi- 
tional mores nor attuned to the social 
and economic needs they required to 
cope with the complexities of rapid 
change.18The secular education system 
did not provide a bridge between the 
new and the old, and therefore it was 
unsuccessful in producing agents for 
gradual progressive change compatible 
with societal ideals. Furthermore, the 
traditional religious schools also failed 
to provide fresh interpretations combin- 
ing change with continuity. They too 
had no bridge between the past and the 
present. 
Instead, while opening new frontiers 
of knowledge, the growth of education 
intensified rivalries in economic com- 
petition, widened political and reli- 
gious disagreements, and sharpened 
appetites for abigger share in the affairs 
of g~vernment.'~ Voluble political ac- 
tivity resulted.20 
Despite these negatives, increas- 
ingly favourable attitudes toward mod- 
em schools did evolve during the 1960s 
as the communication infrastructure 
improved and rural-urban migration 
increased. Sadly, this patiently con- 
structed positive trend changed almost 
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overnight after the Soviet invasion Edu- 
cation in general, and modem educa- 
tion in particular, became anathema as 
the Russians heavily sovietized the sys- 
Due to broadening experiences dur- 
ing exile, this hostility has again been 
replaced with open demands for school- 
ing from many directions, including 
groups which once found secular edu- 
cation repugnant. There is now an op- 
portunity to forge a modem system 
better adapted to Afghan traditions and 
society. 
Where Are We Now? 
First, it is clear that much of what we are 
witnessing today is not new but an ex- 
aggerated continuation of historical 
social processes which must be under- 
stood. 
Second, recognizing that during the 
entire period under discussion strin- 
gent state regulation was a dominating 
feature, now is a time of relative freedom. 
Advantage should be taken of in this 
hiatus to develop model systems, meth- 
ods and materials that can serve to con- 
vince whatever leadership emerges that 
modem education can provide an ac- 
ceptablebridge between the old and the 
new. That education will lead to indi- 
vidual and national prosperity without 
impinging on valued cultural ideals. 
Third, since positive renewed de- 
mands for education are emerging 
among new segments of the society vir- 
tually untouched by the former system, 
one must ask what has created this new 
desire. What aspirations are being 
sought? Are they economic, or some- 
thing deeper? Are individuals perhaps 
seeking to assuage the indignities of 
conflict and exile by acquiring that re- 
spect traditionally accorded to the edu- 
cated? 
Fourth, events have brought to the 
fore a new dominant leadership that is 
not prominently from the graduates of 
the former elite education system. These 
individuals are, nevertheless, gradu- 
ates of non-Afghan institutions where 
they have imbibed ideas, which are in 
many ways equally as objectionable to 
many Afghans as the ideas pro- 
pounded when secular schools were 
first introduced. The conviction that the 
former Western-oriented system cor- 
rupted the entire educational system, 
and with it many aspects of society, 
drive many in the new leadership. Be- 
lieving also that education powerfully 
influences the minds of the young, they 
feel it imperative to carefully monitor 
this sensitive realm. Fear of outside in- 
tervention is abidingly strong. 
Fifth, the ages-old respect for leam- 
ing is still present; none of the new lead- 
ers have repudiated the right of all to 
seek education. Education need not, 
therefore, automatically return to the 
Dark Ages. Tensions between tradi- 
tional and modem systems will con- 
tinue, but inconsistencies abound. 
Individual officials change with regu- 
larity. What is allowed today may be 
disallowed tomorrow; equally, what is 
disallowed today may be allowed to- 
morrow. Out of these types of confu- 
sions future possibilities will arise. 
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